Amid intensifying geopolitical tensions, some analysts suggest that China–Japan relations have entered their most difficult phase since normalization in 1972. From your perspective, how would you evaluate the current situation?
As you noted, it can be said that Japan-China relations have entered their most difficult phase since 1972. The key point, however, is that this baseline would not significantly change regardless of who serves as Japan’s Prime Minister. Ever since Prime Minister Takaichi stated last autumn that “a Taiwan contingency would constitute a survival-threatening situation for Japan,” China’s stance toward Japan has become increasingly harsh. Yet, even under a different Prime Minister, today’s Japan-China relationship is defined by structural conflict, making major improvement difficult. As US-China confrontation intensifies, Japan cannot avoid maintaining and strengthening its ties with the US from the perspectives of defense, national security, and economic security—and it is precisely this posture that causes major dissatisfaction for China. Since US-Japan cooperation itself directly conflicts with China’s national interests, improving Japan-China relations is extremely difficult. Therefore, I view today’s bilateral relationship as something to be “managed.” While improvement is unlikely, the crucial factor for Japan-China relations today is managing a stable environment so that relations do not deteriorate unnecessarily due to unwarranted friction or accidental clashes.
Taiwan has increasingly become a geopolitical chokepoint amid escalating global tensions, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, and the unpredictable Iran–US military standoff. According to the CIA, “as a matter of intelligence,” Xi Jinping has instructed his military to be prepared to conduct an invasion of self‑governed Taiwan by 2027. In this context, Japan appears concerned that such a move could directly threaten its security and survival.How do you assess this scenario?
The view that the Chinese military may attempt a Taiwan invasion by 2027 is naturally a subject of active debate within Japan. Opinions vary widely: while some view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a realistic and imminent threat, others argue that considering the various costs involved, an invasion represents an extremely high-risk option for the Chinese Communist Party. From my perspective, there are two main points to consider:
First, If Taiwan contingency occur, the impact on Japan would be immense. Japan is poor in vital natural resources and relies almost entirely on maritime trade for essential resources and food. These sea lanes pass through the South China Sea, southern Taiwan, and eastern Taiwan. In a contingency, the Chinese military would likely execute a naval blockade, directly impacting Japan’s sea lanes and threatening its energy, food, and economic security.
Second, around 20,000 Japanese nationals reside in Taiwan, making their safe evacuation during a crisis a critical policy challenge. Even more critical, however, is the question of what happens to the safety of Japanese nationals living in mainland China, given that a Taiwan contingency would inevitably lead to a severe worsening of Japan-China relations. Even today, numerous Japanese citizens continue to be detained under China’s anti-espionage law. Under a Taiwan contingency scenario, ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals inside China would become a paramount issue.
Japan–India ties continue to deepen. In recent high‑level talks, India urged Japan to refrain from transferring advanced technology or technical know‑how to Pakistan, warning that such capabilities could ultimately find their way to North Korea. What is your perspective on this diplomatic exchange?
This diplomatic relation reflects the longstanding, complex diplomatic dynamics between India and Pakistan. As is well known, India seeks to contain Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. By calling on Japan to align with its position, India is essentially framing this message to convey: “Restricting these capabilities ultimately serves Japan’s national interest by curbing North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities as well.” Naturally, this appeal makes complete sense from India’s standpoint. Japan places tremendous importance on its relationship with India—especially as India grows into a power even larger than Japan—so the degree to which Japan relies on India will only increase moving forward.
Additionally, the India–Japan Defence Ministers recently discussed strengthening maritime security and signed a Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation. In the context of China’s growing assertiveness, how do you interpret these strategic moves?
To be frank, deterring China’s maritime expansion is impossible for Japan to achieve alone from a defense capability standpoint, and even with cooperation from the US, Australia, and the Philippines, it remains extremely difficult. Under these circumstances, India is a country in which Japan places great trust and high expectations. Just as China’s actions in the Indian Ocean are a direct concern for India, Japan and India share common strategic views in this realm. In that sense, the signing of the memorandum on maritime security cooperation is a significant achievement. However, it remains entirely uncertain how far India would commit to physical involvement in areas like the South China Sea or East China Sea. Given India’s traditional policy of multi-alignment, India will naturally act according to its own national interests within Japan-India maritime security cooperation as well. Japan fully understands this reality.
There is a growing perception that China has initiated an espionage campaign reminiscent of the KGB during the Cold War. Numerous cases reported worldwide appear to support this view. How do you interpret China’s current espionage activities?
This has become a major issue within Japan as well. While espionage takes many forms, the primary concern in Japan is the outflow of confidential information and advanced technology. From an economic security standpoint, Japan is on high alert against foreign leaks of cutting-edge technologies held by Japanese companies that could contribute to the modernization of the Chinese military. To prevent this, the Japanese government is strengthening its economic security measures.
Furthermore, while we should avoid jumping to direct associations between ordinary Chinese citizens and the Chinese government, Japan is facing severe population decline, leading to a rising number of vacant houses and ownerless land. The number of foreigners and foreign capital purchasing land in rural areas continues to increase, prompting Japan to tighten measures to prevent land acquisitions near Self-Defense Forces and US military bases. Additionally, as an island nation with many uninhabited islands, growing concerns surround the purchase of remote islands by foreign entities.
Keitaro Ohno, a Japanese politician leading the ruling party’s Intelligence Strategy Headquarters, recently remarked: “The security environment has become the most severe and the most complex since the end of World War II.” Some Japanese leaders have long advocated for deeper ties with the “Five Eyes” intelligence network. In your analysis, how has Japan been struggling to confront China’s espionage operations?
As highlighted by Mr. Ono’s remarks, the struggles Japan faces in countering China’s extensive and sophisticated espionage operations stem from “structural vulnerabilities” across three key dimensions: legal systems, organizational structure, and social structure.
First is the lack of offensive and defensive legal frameworks. Japan lacks a comprehensive Anti-Espionage Law like those found in other countries, relying instead on piecemeal legislation such as the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and the Economic Security Promotion Act (which includes a security clearance system). Consequently, legal means to regulate or penalize industrial espionage outside military secrets, as well as gray-zone influence operations, remain severely limited. In cyberspace, passing legislation for “Active Cyber Defense” remains an ongoing challenge, imposing constraints on intelligence activities aimed at proactively preventing attacks.
Second is the fragmentation of intelligence agencies and the hurdles to joining the “Five Eyes.” Japan lacks a unified foreign intelligence agency like the CIA or MI6. Instead, intelligence functions are dispersed across the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, National Police Agency, Ministry of Defense, and Public Security Intelligence Agency, with inter-agency silos frequently hindering collaboration. While calls to strengthen ties with the Five Eyes grow louder, Japan has yet to fully meet the strict information security standards required by the framework—such as severe criminal penalties for leaks and advanced cybersecurity infrastructure—creating a barrier to entering deeper layers of information sharing.
Third is the vulnerability inherent in an open social and economic structure. Paradoxically, the very nature of a free and open societal system—encompassing academic exchanges, international student admissions, and foreign real estate acquisitions—makes it an easy target for China’s “non-traditional intelligence collection activities,” which gather intelligence not just through professional operatives, but also via researchers, private citizens, and commercial enterprises.
Daiju Wada is an international political scientist specializing in international security, counter-terrorism, and economic security. He currently serves as a Distinguished Professor at PRIME GLORY PTE. LTD. in Singapore and contributes as an external expert to geopolitical risk organizations, including Oxford Analytica and Gatehouse Advisory Partners. As CEO of Strategic Intelligence, he provides critical geopolitical intelligence to international consulting firms.
