Israel has faced criticism—even from close European partners—over its war against Hamas and the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi’s second visit to Tel Aviv underscores a visible strengthening of India–Israel ties. Historically, Indian leaders were more cautious in publicly acknowledging the relationship, with some even postponing visits due to regional sensitivities. How do you interpret this evolution in India’s approach, and what key factors have enabled such a significant policy shift?
I would see Modi’s visit not as a sudden break with India’s past, but as the culmination of a much longer process. India’s relationship with Israel had already been developing for decades, particularly in defence, agriculture, water and technology. What was different in the past was the level of political visibility. Indian governments often preferred to keep the relationship relatively discreet because they were balancing several sensitivities at once: India’s historical support for the Palestinian cause, its ties with the Arab world and Iran, its energy dependence, and the presence of a very large Indian community in the Gulf.
What has changed under Modi is therefore not the existence of the relationship, but the willingness to acknowledge it openly and invest political capital in it. Modi’s first visit to Israel in 2017 was highly significant because it treated Israel as an important partner in its own right. His second visit reinforces the message that Israel is now an established pillar of India’s West Asia policy, rather than a relationship that must remain politically concealed.
Several developments made this possible. First, India itself has become more strategically confident. New Delhi increasingly believes that it can maintain strong relations with Israel, the Palestinians, the Gulf states and Iran simultaneously, without allowing one relationship to dictate all the others.
Second, the regional environment has changed. The development of open relations between Israel and several Arab countries reduced some of the political cost that India once associated with a visible relationship with Israel.
Third, the bilateral relationship is no longer defined primarily by arms sales. It now includes innovation, agriculture, water, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, critical technologies, health and connectivity.This makes the partnership broader and politically easier to present.
And finally, Modi and Netanyahu have both personalized the relationship to a certain degree. Their public diplomacy has made the partnership more visible, although the relationship is also increasingly supported by institutions, companies and long-term strategic interests.
At the same time, India has not formally abandoned its support for Palestinian statehood. The real evolution is that India no longer sees close ties with Israel and support for a two-state solution as mutually exclusive.
I would describe the change as a movement from cautious balancing through distance to balancing through simultaneous engagement.
The U.S.–Israel relationship is often described as “special.” Recently, Prime Minister Netanyahu highlighted India as one of Israel’s strongest supporters, offering a counterpoint to U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s assertion that America is Israel’s only powerful ally. In this context, how is Washington likely to view the growing New Delhi–Tel Aviv partnership—as a complementary strategic asset, or as a recalibration of traditional alignments? How would you assess the evolving triangular dynamic among the U.S., Israel, and India?
I think Washington will largely view it as complementary to American interests rather than as a challenge to the United States.
The United States remains in a category of its own in Israel’s security environment. It provides a level of military support, diplomatic backing and strategic coordination that India does not seek to replace and, realistically, could not replace.
India’s value to Israel is different. India provides strategic diversification. It is a major economic and technological power, an important actor in the Indo-Pacific and the Global South, and a partner with which Israel can develop long-term industrial and technological cooperation. From an American perspective, stronger relations between India and Israel can support several shared objectives. These include resilient supply chains, trusted technology networks, connectivity between Asia, the Gulf and the Mediterranean, and alternatives to excessive dependence on China. Frameworks such as I2U2 are a good example. The idea was not to create a formal military alliance, but to connect the complementary capabilities of India, Israel, the United States and the UAE in areas such as infrastructure, food security, energy and technology. So I would describe the triangle as important but asymmetrical.
The United States remains Israel’s indispensable strategic partner. India is becoming one of Israel’s most important strategic, technological and diplomatic partners. Israel, in turn, offers India access to defence technologies, innovation ecosystems and new forms of regional cooperation.
But we should not assume that the three countries will always agree. India retains a strong commitment to strategic autonomy. It will not necessarily adopt American or Israeli positions on Iran, Russia, Palestine or every regional military crisis.
This is therefore not a trilateral alliance. It is a network of overlapping partnerships based on significant areas of convergence, but also on continued national autonomy.
Pakistan has voiced unease over the strengthening India–Israel partnership, with some in Islamabad portraying it in strongly negative terms. From Israel’s perspective, how do you interpret Pakistan’s apprehensions regarding this rapprochement? What underlying factors do you believe are driving these anxieties?
Pakistan’s concerns are understandable from its own strategic perspective, although they are sometimes expressed in highly ideological terms.
The most immediate concern is military and technological. Israel has provided India with capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, air defence, radar, unmanned systems and precision strike. From Islamabad’s perspective, these capabilities could improve India’s ability to identify targets, protect its own assets and conduct more accurate military operations.,
The concern is not only about individual weapons systems. It is about the integration of sensors, intelligence, command-and-control systems, drones and precision weapons into a more effective operational architecture.
There is also a political and ideological dimension. Pakistani political discourse has often drawn comparisons between the conflict with India and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These comparisons are politically useful inside Pakistan, but analytically they are often misleading because the two conflicts have different historical, institutional and strategic characteristics.
A third source of anxiety is Pakistan’s fear of diplomatic marginalization. India has demonstrated that it can deepen its relationship with Israel while also expanding its relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other important Muslim-majority states. This reduces Pakistan’s ability to use Islamic solidarity or the Palestinian issue as a means of constraining India diplomatically.
The India–Israel relationship also carries symbolic weight. It reflects India’s growing international influence and its ability to maintain relationships that would once have been considered politically difficult.’
From Israel’s point of view, however, Pakistan is not normally viewed in the same category as Iran. Pakistan is not Israel’s principal adversary. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, missile programme, history of proliferation, close strategic relationship with China, and the presence of militant organizations on its territory mean that Israel cannot ignore developments there.
The key point is that India–Israel cooperation is not formally directed against Pakistan. Israel is also unlikely to seek direct involvement in the India–Pakistan conflict. But Islamabad will inevitably assess the partnership through the lens of its military competition with India.
Within the framework of India–Israel relations, Pakistan remains a challenging factor due to its continued harbouring and support of terror groups in the region. Given this background, India has been emphasizing the need for renewed international pressure to dismantle these networks. This claim can be compared to Israel’s calls for disarming groups in Lebanon and Gaza. In your view, what role might Israel play in shaping broader international responses to such threats?
Israel can make an important contribution, but I would be careful not to frame this as Israel becoming directly involved in the India–Pakistan dispute. India and Israel share a fundamental concern: terrorist organizations do not operate only through the individuals who carry out attacks. They depend on financing, recruitment, logistical networks, digital platforms, territorial sanctuaries and, in some cases, political or institutional protection.
The most important area of cooperation is intelligence. India and Israel can share expertise in identifying terrorist financing, recruitment networks, cross-border movement, weapons transfers and online radicalization.
A second area is international financial pressure. Both countries can work with the United States, European governments and international institutions to improve the enforcement of counterterrorism-financing mechanisms.
But such efforts must be evidence-based. Broad political accusations are less effective than detailed documentation of specific organizations, individuals, financial channels and support structures.
A third area is diplomatic coordination. India and Israel can cooperate in international forums to strengthen designation and sanctions mechanisms against organizations responsible for attacks on civilians.
There is also a growing technological dimension. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and advanced data analysis can help identify networks and patterns of activity. At the same time, these tools must be subject to legal safeguards, oversight and reliable evidentiary standards.
I would also be cautious about making a direct equivalence between Pakistan-based militant groups and armed organizations in Gaza or Lebanon. There may be similarities in the use of territorial sanctuaries or external support, but the political and institutional contexts are different.
Israel’s most constructive role would therefore be to support targeted, evidence-based international action against specific terrorist organizations and their support networks—not to advocate the internationalization or militarization of the India–Pakistan conflict.
Pakistan often presents itself as a mediator but has struggled to deliver lasting breakthroughs, particularly in the U.S.–Iran conflict. At the same time, its diplomatic signalling abroad is weakened by domestic policy failures, while it continues to advance its weapons program and act as a proxy terror exporter against India. How does Israel perceive Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in this context?
I think we need to separate Pakistan’s diplomatic role from the security concerns surrounding its strategic capabilities.
Pakistan did play a meaningful role in the U.S.–Iran crisis. Together with Qatar and other regional actors, it provided channels of communication between Washington and Tehran and helped facilitate the temporary understandings reached in June. The fact that these understandings later came under severe strain does not mean that Pakistan’s mediation was meaningless. It does, however, demonstrate the limits of Pakistan’s leverage.
Pakistan can facilitate communication, transmit proposals and provide a politically acceptable venue for negotiations. It cannot necessarily compel either the United States or Iran to honour an agreement when the parties’ fundamental disputes remain unresolved.
From an Israeli perspective, however, Pakistan’s diplomatic activism does not eliminate concerns about its military capabilities. The two issues need to be assessed separately.
Pakistan’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes were developed primarily in the context of deterrence against India. India remains the central reference point for Pakistan’s nuclear posture, force structure and missile development.
For that reason, I would be cautious about claiming that Pakistan’s present missile programme is directly aimed at Israel. There is not sufficient public evidence for such a conclusion. Nevertheless, Israel has several reasons to monitor the programme.
The first is range. If Pakistan develops missiles with significantly longer ranges, the strategic relevance of the programme could extend beyond the Indian subcontinent.
The second concern is proliferation. The legacy of the A.Q. Khan network continues to shape international perceptions of Pakistan. Any expansion of its nuclear-capable missile programme will therefore be examined not only in terms of deterrence, but also in terms of technology transfer and export-control risks.
The third issue is command and control. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state facing domestic political volatility, economic pressure and the continued presence of militant organizations. This does not mean that its nuclear arsenal is uncontrolled, but it does explain why external actors remain attentive to institutional stability and the security ofstrategic assets.
The fourth issue is Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China. Chinese assistance has played an important role in Pakistan’s military modernization. The programme therefore has implications not only for India–Pakistan deterrence, but also for the wider strategic competition involving China, India and the United States.
Israel is likely to examine Pakistan’s missile programme through four main questions: the range of the systems, the security of command and control, the risk of proliferation, and the extent to which Pakistan’s strategic orientation could change in the future.
The important distinction is between capability and intention. Pakistan may not currently intend to direct its missile capabilities against Israel, but capabilities can endure while governments,doctrines and regional alignments change.
That is why Israel has reason to monitor the programme carefully, without exaggerating Pakistan into an immediate or primary Israeli adversary.
More broadly, Pakistan’s role in the U.S.–Iran crisis illustrates a central contradiction in its international position. It seeks recognition as a responsible diplomatic and strategic actor, and at times it can indeed serve as a useful intermediary. At the same time, its international credibility continues to be affected by concerns about proliferation, political instability and militant networks operating from its territory.
These two dimensions of Pakistan—diplomatic facilitator and source of strategic concern—can coexist. One should not be used to erase the other.
India’s Operation Sindoor marked a significant evolution in its approach to confronting state-sponsored terrorism. Given Israel’s extensive experience in addressing cross-border threats, how do you envision deeper India–Israel cooperation shaping future efforts against terrorism as a shared challenge? What areas of collaboration hold the greatest potential impact?
Operation Sindoor marked an important stage in India’s evolving approach to cross-border terrorism. Th central Indian message was that a major terrorist attack would not necessarily be treated only as a law-enforcement or diplomatic issue. It could also produce a direct and visible response against infrastructure that India identified as linked to terrorist activity.
But I would resist the temptation to say that India has simply adopted an Israeli model. India and Israel operate in very different strategic environments.India faces another nuclear-armed state, a long and complex border,and escalation dynamics that are quite different from those Israel faces.
The most valuable cooperation between the two countries would therefore not simply involve more weapons. It would focus on improving intelligence, attribution, precision and political control.
The first area is intelligence fusion: combining human intelligence,signals intelligence, satellite imagery, cyber information and open-source intelligence in order to establish reliable attribution
before action is taken.
A second area is drones and counter-drone capabilities. Both countries face rapidly evolving threats from inexpensive unmanned systems used for surveillance, smuggling and attacks on military or civilian infrastructure.
A third area is border and critical-infrastructure protection. This includes sensors, command-and-control systems and the defence of airports, energy facilities and military installations.
Cybersecurity is another major field. Terrorist and state-linked actors increasingly operate across both physical and digital domains. India and Israel can cooperate on early warning, protection of critical infrastructure and the sharing of threat intelligence.
There is also potential for cooperation on terrorist financing, encrypted communications and online recruitment networks. Israel’s experience in civilian resilience and emergency response is also relevant. India, for its part, offers scale, advanced technological capabilities and experience operating across extremely varied geographical environments.
But escalation management must be central to this cooperation. India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states. Any improvement in India’s ability to respond must be accompanied by political control, reliable communication and a clear understanding of the risks of escalation.
The most useful India–Israel cooperation is therefore cooperation that makes counterterrorism responses more accurate, more discriminate and more controllable—not simply more destructive.
Looking ahead how might the growing India–Israel partnership influence South Asia’s broader security architecture? Do you see this cooperation contributing to greater regional stability, or potentially reshaping the balance of power in ways that redefine existing alignments?
The impact will be complex. It could contribute to stability in some respects while generating new pressures in others. On the stabilizing side, improved intelligence, air defence, border surveillance and precision-strike capabilities may strengthen deterrence by denial.
If India can detect attacks earlier, protect critical assets more effectively and respond with greater precision, potential adversaries may become less confident that terrorism can be used without significant consequences.
The relationship may also improve the protection of civilian infrastructure and strengthen international action against terrorist financing. But there is also a classic security dilemma.
Capabilities that India regards as defensive may be viewed by Pakistan as offensive. For example, improved intelligence, precision weapons and air defence may be interpreted in Islamabad as giving India greater confidence to conduct pre-emptive or limited strikes. Pakistan may respond by investing further in missiles, drones, tactical nuclear systems, cyber capabilities and deeper military cooperation with China.
This means that the regional security architecture is no longer defined only by the India–Pakistan balance.We are increasingly seeing the interaction of several overlapping strategic relationships: India’s growing security and technological cooperation with Israel and the United States; the deeply institutionalized China–Pakistan relationship; and the more flexible policies of the Gulf States, Iran and Russia.
I do not think this will produce a rigid bloc system. India remains resistant to formal alliances, Israel’s central security focus remains the Middle East, and the United States continues to maintain different kinds of relations with both India and Pakistan.
The India–Israel partnership will reshape aspects of the regional balance, particularly in technology, intelligence and precision warfare. But whether it contributes to stability will depend on more than military capabilities.
It will depend on doctrine, political restraint, command and control, crisis communication and the ability to prevent a limited confrontation from escalating. My overall assessment is that India–Israel cooperation can contribute to regional stability—but only if technological advantage is accompanied by credible mechanisms for escalation management.
Military superiority by itself does not guarantee strategic stability. The India–Israel relationship has become more visible, more politically confident and more technologically sophisticated. But it remains a strategic partnership between two autonomous states—not a formal alliance and not a partnership designed exclusively against any third country.
Its future importance will depend on whether the two countries can move beyond a traditional buyer–seller relationship and build long-term cooperation in technology, intelligence, defence production, resilience and regional connectivity.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos is a researcher specializing in India’s foreign and security policy, with a regional focus on the Indo-Pacific. She is a fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University. Dr. Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum, which promotes women in Israel’s foreign and defense policy community.
