The German general and geopolitician Karl Haushofer first coined and conceptualized the term “Indo-Pacific” (Indopazifischer Raum) in the 1920s. He argued that the global balance of power would shift from the Atlantic toward the demographic and economic powerhouses surrounding the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Although Haushofer introduced the term nearly a century ago, when the Jewish State was in its infancy, he likely did not anticipate its future relevance to Israel. For decades, Israel regarded the Indo-Pacific as a distant region—important, yet secondary to the immediate concerns of Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. However, this perspective is no longer tenable. The conflicts of 2024–2025, including the Gaza conflict and the confrontation with Iran, have redirected Israel’s strategic focus eastward.
The Indo-Pacific region, extending from India to Japan and Southeast Asia, has become strategically indispensable for Israel. Three primary factors are driving this shift: the increasing prominence of India and Japan as strategic anchors, the escalating confrontation with China’s assertive behavior, and the uncertainty arising from the Trump administration’s evolving Indo-Pacific policy Together, they create a new landscape in which Israel must reposition itself or risk becoming strategically irrelevant in the world’s most dynamic mega-region.
Against this backdrop, Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos of Bar-Ilan University in Israel delivered a lecture on Israel’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Amos’s talk revealed only the tip of the iceberg, underscoring a stark contrast with Jerusalem’s traditional foreign policy, which has focused primarily on its Middle Eastern neighbors, prioritized national security, and maintained close ties with the US. Amos highlighted shifting dynamics—particularly after October 7th—within Israel as it seeks new foreign policy opportunities while some traditional allies have distanced themselves. Central to Amos’s argument is a rejection of Mackinder’s classic emphasis on geography as the key to strategic influence; she contends that being a strategic player is not merely about controlling a region. Instead, Amos argues, Israel does not seek an Indo-Pacific strategy to become a regional power. Rather, such a strategy is essential because Israel’s economic, technological, and security resilience now depends on engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
The current challenges that surround Israel’s foreign policy architecture further explain why Israel needs to accelerate its presence in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific—specifically anchored by the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea—is the definitive geographic crucible of the 21st century. In the words of Robert Kaplan, the greater Indian Ocean and South China Sea are a vital mixing pot of energy supplies, trade routes, and civilizational friction points. When it comes to Israel’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, one needs to realize that it does not embody a pivot from Jerusalem’s traditional reliance on the USA as its most reliable partner for security and strategy or a shift from Israel’s economic-trade cooperation with Europe. In fact , Israel’s bent towards the Indo-Pacific is a reminder of Ben Gurion’s peripheral doctrine in the 50’s, wherein Israel was forging its ties with non-Muslim states in a situation where the Arab world remained hostile to Israel. Although Israel’s view on the Indo-Pacific is not entirely akin to the bygone doctrine of periphery, the compelling reasons that it strives to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific can be attributed to the same dilemmas that Israel suffered in the 50s, ranging from diplomatic networking and energy.
Dr. Lauren’s lecture clearly illustrated how the definition of national security has evolved beyond its traditional focus on military power. Today, national security encompasses safeguarding energy supplies, driving technological transformation, and addressing many other dimensions. Despite its geographic distance from the region, Israel has emerged as an active player in the Indo-Pacific, leveraging its technological dominance to forge broader relationships. For example, Israeli companies such as Maris-Tech and Memcyo are operating in Singapore. Meanwhile, Israeli technology and AI firms are collaborating closely with India in areas like defense, industrial automation, and the deep-tech startup ecosystem. These partnerships connect Israel’s combat-tested software and AI capabilities with India’s large-scale manufacturing ambitions and pursuit of domestic self-reliance.
Thus, Israel’s outlook toward the Indo-Pacific is rooted in its long-term strategic ambitions, within which India occupies an indispensable position in advancing Israel’s strategic vision. In her astute analysis, Amos highlights an important factor that has been overlooked by many Israeli think tanks focusing on the Indo-Pacific. She draws attention to Sri Lanka and its strategic position in the Indian Ocean, which cannot be overlooked by any actor seeking to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific. In her words, “for Israel, viewing the Indo-Pacific through India only creates a strategic blind spot.” From this perspective, her analysis helps explain why Jerusalem is eager to bolster its ties with Sri Lanka under all circumstances.
However, several salient factors are absent from Lauren’s analysis. First, Washington’s efforts to contain China constitute a significant constraint on Israel’s ability to consolidate its presence in the Indo-Pacific, while Beijing’s growing ties with the Middle East could likewise complicate Israel’s strategic ambitions. Moreover, the technological partnerships developed by Israeli companies across the region also warrant attention, as their expanding cooperation could expose sensitive technologies and create significant intelligence vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China.
All in all, Israel’s vision for the Indo-Pacific is still in its early stages, with many ups and downs. Strategic strength today comes from networks, not patrons. It comes from working with countries that face similar challenges, seek similar capabilities, and value mutual resilience. Therefore, Israel’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot move forward solely based on India. Put it simply, as Carice Witte, the founder of Israeli think tank SIGNAL, stated, managing Beijing is a strategic necessity for the Jewish State to buttress its presence in the Indo-Pacific theatre.
Dr Punsara Amarasinghe is a lecturer affiliated to the Department of International Law, Faculty of Law, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

Dr Punsara Amarasinghe