Historically, ties between India and Sri Lanka have been described as “special” and consistently high on the bilateral agenda. Yet, recurring challenges have at times clouded the relationship. In Sri Lanka, some observers characterize Colombo’s approach to New Delhi as a “love–hate” dynamic. How would you evaluate the current state of Indo–Sri Lanka relations, particularly under the present government in Colombo?
There is an old adage in the foreign policy that there are no permanent friends or enemies but interests . This is defined by respective leaders at any given time according to their own politico-economic priorities. India-Sri Lanka ties are historic and civilization and driven by mutual respect and mutual interests . I don’t think it was ‘love and hate’ relationship but perhaps certain regimes and leaders are carried away by India’s economic and military heft and wish to balance it by resorting to external actors. Sometimes this pursuit could lead to long term harm to themselves as was witnessed before the current dispensation came in. For New Delhi , Neighbourhood First non-reciprocal policy was seen during the Sri Lankan crisis when it stepped in decisively to assist the people of Sri Lanka. Each country is free to choose its path and partners . Today, one witnesses a fair and positive estimation of India-Sri Lanka partnership leaving aside the hyperbole of political expediency.
New Delhi has expressed strong interest in advancing economic cooperation, particularly through land and sea connectivity and major investment initiatives in strategic Trincomalee—such as energy-hub development, port expansion, and an oil refinery. However, progress on these flagship projects appears slower than expected, prompting Prime Minister Narendra Modi to raise concerns. How do you view the trajectory of these strategic initiatives?
I think all these projects are critical for the benefit of Sri Lankan people and need to be expedited . Of course, any genuine concerns of the people and polity need to be addressed in a transparent manner by all concerned . PM Modi is committed to help advance the cause and welfare of Sri Lankan people . Connectivity and sustainability and trust are critical to the growth , development and economic well being as well as strategic projects.
Colombo has often emphasized its commitment to non-alignment and neutrality, presenting this as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Yet Sri Lanka’s geographic reality—its proximity to India—remains a constant factor. In the past, the country has faced geopolitical pressure when asserting a high degree of foreign policy independence. How do you interpret Colombo’s current rhetoric of neutrality in the context of today’s evolving geopolitical environment?
Sri Lankan leadership will of course look after the interests of its people through whatever policies it deems appropriate .Non-alignment , neutrality and strategic autonomy have been there and will be there as India practices it to the hilt but in a relationship marked by mutual interests it is important that mutual sensitivities and security interests of each other in this volatile world . I am confident that both Indian and Sri Lankan governments are able to address these perceptions and issues if any to the mutual benefit .
China’s presence in the Indian Ocean Region has become increasingly visible in recent years. At one stage, Colombo was widely perceived as moving closer to Beijing’s strategic orbit. How would you characterize China’s current footprint in Sri Lanka and, more broadly, in India’s neighborhood?
China is a real major power in the region and often the interests seem to overlap with those of India especially its so called ‘String of Pearls strategy ‘ which is seen as containment of India . Hambantota project is one such example or for that matter stationing of its surveillance naval assets there . Indian companies are also working to develop Sri Lankan ports and infrastructure. India and Sri Lanka also cooperate and collaborate in the context of IORA, SAGAR , MAHASAGAR , IOFC , Colombo Security Conclave and BIMSTEC etc. The Neighbourhood partners have a unique civilization , terrestrial and maritime connect with India which is embellished by people to people connect giving New Delhi a soft power differential vis a vis China .
In your assessment, what lies at the core of China’s engagement in India’s southern sphere of influence? Some analysts suggest it is primarily linked to U.S.–China competition rather than directly targeting India, while others argue it reflects a deliberate effort to limit India’s rise. How do you interpret this debate?
India follows a policy of ‘Competition with Cooperation and avoidance of Conflict ‘with China and both are trying to find a mutually beneficial route to a reasonable modus vivendi . Not an easy task since the ground reality is different . As China understands its limitations of Malacca Straits and geo political contestation in the Indo-Pacific its approach to its desire to find a strong Naval foothold in the Indian Ocean is quite real. This also implies a direct impact on India’s security considerations which is concerning being a resident Indian ocean actor and power and its own concerns of Chinese intent in the region . Both do work closely in international arena including SCO, BRICS, G20 and the WTO and UN etc. for the befit of global south .
Amb. Anil Trigunayat is a member of the Indian Foreign Service. He has served in the Indian Missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Bangladesh, Mongolia, USA, Russia, Sweden and Nigeria, Libya and Jordan. In the Ministry of External Affairs he has worked in the Economic, West Asia and North Africa and Consular Divisions. He also served as Director General/Joint Secretary for the Gulf & Haj Divisions in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. Thereafter, Mr. Trigunayat worked as Deputy Chief of Mission in the rank of Ambassador in the Embassy of India, Moscow Prior to his superannuation in May 2016, he served as Ambassador of India to Jordan and Libya and High Commissioner to Malta (June 2012 – May 2016). He is a post Graduate in Physics from the Agra/Kumaon University and also studied Russian History, Culture and Language at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. As a visiting fellow he also conducted research work on “WTO and Regional Trading Blocs” at the Oxford University. He is a member of the All India Management Association/Delhi Management Association as well as that of Oxford and Cambridge Society of India and the Association of Indian Diplomats (former Ambassadors). He is also the Honorary Member of the International Trade Council, Brussels.
