Dr. Nadia Helmy is an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics, the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, and Asian affairs. She currently serves as Professor of Political Science at Beni Suef University, Egypt. In addition, she is a Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), Lund University, Sweden, where she also directs the South and East Asia Studies Unit.
For much of the late 20th century, Western security services regarded Chinese intelligence as primarily focused on domestic stability. In recent years, however, allegations of espionage, cyber operations, and covert activities have reshaped this perception. Today, China’s intelligence apparatus is seen as an increasingly active global player, though far less publicly discussed than agencies like the CIA or Mossad. How should we understand Chinese intelligence—its tactics, methods, and strategic objectives?
The world’s perception of Chinese intelligence has shifted from a closed, inward-looking apparatus to a transnational superpower. To understand this entity, it must be viewed as a system that does not separate national security, economic growth, and political stability. A simplified analysis of their methods and objectives can be achieved by understanding their strategic goals, namely the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation. Chinese intelligence operates to achieve three major objectives: (Ensuring the Survival of the Regime): monitoring dissidents abroad, such as the (Falun Gong movement or Uyghur and Tibetan activists), (Technological Superiority): acquiring Western technological secrets (artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and renewable energy) to bridge the technological gap, and (Political Influence): influencing decision-making centres in Western countries to ensure pro-China policies.
To this end, Chinese intelligence agencies employ a strategy of tactics and methods known in intelligence circles as “a thousand grains of sand”. China employs a unique strategy that differs from the traditional James Bond approach, through:
- A whole-of-society approach: Instead of relying solely on professional officers, China leverages “non-traditional sources” such as academics, students, and businesspeople, sometimes referred to as the “thousand grains of sand” theory (collecting small pieces of information from a large number of sources to form a complete picture).
- Professional cyber espionage: China possesses one of the world’s largest cyber attack armies, primarily focused on corporate espionage and intellectual property theft, not just military secrets.
- Human intelligence (HUMINT): This involves cultivating long-term relationships with former officials or academics through professional networking platforms like LinkedIn to offer seemingly legitimate research or consulting services.
Finally, the (institutional structure) plays a vital role in the success of Chinese intelligence agencies. The main driving force is the (Ministry of State Security) “MSS”, which combines functions similar to those of the CIA and FBI. But what is unique is the role of the United Front Work Department, a Communist Party agency that aims to neutralize adversaries and garner support among Chinese communities abroad and foreign elites.
What makes the work of Chinese intelligence agencies “different” is that while Mossad, for example, focuses on kinetic operations and assassinations, and US intelligence focuses on military-technological superiority, China focuses on economic intelligence. They see economic power as the foundation of sovereignty, so stealing an aircraft engine blueprint or a chemical formula is no less important than stealing a war plan.
China is often portrayed as a cyber power, using dual‑purpose technologies. In this context, what role do hackers play within its intelligence system?
Cyber hackers play a pivotal role in China’s strategy as a cyber superpower, serving as an operational tool within a complex intelligence system that integrates military, economic, and political objectives. As of 2026, these roles have evolved to become more specialized and integrated with artificial intelligence technologies. Their role within the intelligence system can be summarized as follows: (Economic and Industrial Espionage): Stealing intellectual property and trade secrets is a key task for Chinese hackers to support national strategies such as “Made in China 2025”. They target advanced technology sectors such as semiconductors, renewable energy, and pharmaceuticals to reduce domestic research and development costs. (Pre-positioning Critical Infrastructure): Recent reports in 2025 and 2026 (such as those concerning the “Volt Typhoon” group) reveal a shift in objectives from mere espionage to “positioning” themselves within the electricity, water, and telecommunications networks of Western countries. The goal is to possess the capability to physically disrupt these facilities in the event of a future military conflict. In addition to hybrid intelligence operations, tasks are divided among various entities, such as:
- The Ministry of State Security (MSS): Focuses on foreign espionage, political intelligence gathering, and targeting government institutions and global corporations.
- The People’s Liberation Army Cyber Force (CSF): Primarily focuses on military targets and defense networks.
- The Ministry of Public Security (MPS): Handles domestic intelligence operations and surveillance of dissidents.
- Exploiting dual-use technologies: Hackers use legitimate tools pre-installed on systems (a technique known as “Living off the Land”) to avoid detection, making it difficult to distinguish between ordinary cyber activity and intelligence attacks. Artificial intelligence is also integrated to automate vulnerability detection and customize phishing attacks.
- Monitoring transnational opposition: Hackers are tasked with tracking and monitoring Chinese activists and dissidents abroad, such as those involved in Taiwanese and Hong Kong independence movements, to ensure the regime’s political stability.
During the ongoing conflict involving Iran, some observers suggest that China has remained relatively detached. Yet you argue that Chinese intelligence in the Middle East is actively working to counter Mossad’s operations. How do you assess China’s espionage interventions in this war?
A crucial point has been raised regarding the “silent engagement” in the region. While Beijing publicly adopts a cautious diplomacy to safeguard its economic interests, security analysts believe its behind-the-scenes intelligence activities take on a completely different character.
China’s espionage interventions in this context can be assessed from (three main angles): First, (securing the “informational Silk Road”): China is not acting on behalf of Iran as an “ideological” ally, but rather as a “geopolitical” partner. Chinese intelligence focuses on monitoring movements that could destabilize energy supplies. This requires close tracking of Mossad operations targeting Iranian facilities to prevent the region from sliding into a full-blown war that would harm Beijing’s interests. Second, (technological and cyber superiority): China is emerging as a powerful player in the field of cyber espionage. Reports indicate that Beijing shares advanced surveillance technologies with its regional partners, limiting Mossad’s ability to operate freely in the digital realm. This type of intervention is a “proxy confrontation” conducted through technological means rather than direct conflict. Third, (neutralizing influence and expanding its regional role): China views international intelligence activities in the region as part of the global balance of power. Therefore, understanding and disrupting certain intelligence operations could be seen as an indirect way to bolster Beijing’s position as an independent great power in the Middle East, thus positioning itself as an alternative “stabilizing force” focused on economic development.
In short, the Chinese position can be described as “strategic neutrality”. It maintains an equidistant military and political stance publicly, but remains actively engaged in intelligence gathering to protect its massive investments and ensure the security of international trade routes.
Building on that, do you observe any indications of collaboration between China and Pakistan in shaping intelligence strategies concerning the Middle East?
Evidence points to close strategic and security cooperation between China and Pakistan, extending beyond economic aspects to include intelligence coordination. China leverages Pakistan’s historical ties in the Middle East, and the two countries are working together to enhance regional influence, secure the (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC”, and address shared security challenges, according to strategic analyses. Key indicators of this strategic and intelligence cooperation, include: (Close security and military coordination): Both countries have pledged to strengthen cooperation in security and trade, and defense relations are developing robustly, paving the way for high-level intelligence coordination. Furthermore, (Utilizing Pakistani influence): China seeks to leverage Pakistan’s strong relationships with Middle Eastern and Islamic countries to bolster its geostrategic influence. And (Securing joint projects): The (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC” is a central pillar of this cooperation, requiring joint intelligence to safeguard Chinese infrastructure and labor in Pakistan. With regard to coordination on important regional issues such as Afghanistan: Reports indicate Chinese mediation in bridging the gap between the Taliban and Pakistan, reflecting an exchange of information and coordination of strategies for dealing with Middle Eastern and South Asian issues. With regard to strategic trust between China and Pakistan: Pakistan affirms that its partnership with China is based on “strategic trust and alignment”, which strengthens intelligence sharing.
This cooperation is viewed within the context of “friendship under all circumstances” and the shared goal of creating a balance of regional power, particularly in the face of Western and Indian influence.
You have also noted that Chinese intelligence and defense think tanks closely study the performance of Israeli, Western, and American weapons in conflicts such as Ukraine, and now apply similar analysis to Iran. Their aim is to adapt these lessons to strengthen China’s own defense systems, particularly through artificial intelligence. In your view, does this suggest China is preparing for a military campaign against Taiwan?
Yes, this behavior indicates that China places the “military option” against Taiwan at the heart of its strategic plans, but it does not necessarily mean an imminent attack. Researchers and planners in Beijing view current conflicts as “living laboratories” to test the effectiveness of both Western and Chinese technology. Here are some key takeaways from this Chinese approach: (Bridging the technological gap through “proxy laboratories”): Chinese research centers consider current wars (Ukraine and the tensions between Iran and Israel) to provide invaluable data on how American weapons, such as: (Patriot missiles, HIMARS, and drones) perform against defensive and offensive systems similar to those possessed by China.
- On the Iranian side: Beijing is studying the ability of Chinese radars, such as: (the YLC-8B) to detect (American stealth fighters and the resilience of the BeiDou-3 navigation system as a Chinese alternative to GPS) against Western jamming.
- On the Ukrainian front: China is analyzing the failures of joint operations and Russian logistics to avoid repeating them in the Taiwan scenario, which requires a complex amphibious landing.
Herein lies the role of artificial intelligence as a force multiplier for China. Integrating AI into Chinese defense systems is part of its “intelligentized warfare” strategy. The objectives are: (speed of decision-making): developing algorithms that surpass human commanders in managing and coordinating massive, simultaneous attacks, and (scenario simulation): using real-world data from the battlefields to feed Chinese simulation systems, thus bridging the gap resulting from the Chinese military’s decades-long lack of actual combat experience.
This is preparation for a potential Chinese military campaign against Taiwan should Taiwan persist in its secession from mainland China and deviate from the “One China” principle. These Chinese moves indicate strategic readiness rather than an announcement of an attack’s timing. Through its deterrence strategy, China hopes to convince the United States that the cost of intervening to defend Taiwan would be prohibitively high by developing systems to counter Western weapons. And (Preparing for a Protracted Conflict): China has adjusted its plans from the concept of a “rapid invasion” to preparing for a high-intensity, sustained conflict, after witnessing how the conflict in Ukraine has devolved into a war of attrition. With a (diversionary strategy): China supports its allies. such as (Iran) to keep American military and political resources stretched thin in the Middle East, thus weakening Washington’s ability to fully focus on the Pacific region.
Therefore, we can conclude that China’s meticulous study of weapons performance in Ukraine and Iran is an attempt to minimize the “unknowns” in any future conflict over Taiwan. China is not merely preparing to launch a campaign, but rather preparing to ensure victory with minimal losses and in the shortest possible time, through information and technological superiority.
